In close elections, the losing side has an incentive to obtain evidence that the election result is incorrect. Sometimes this evidence comes in the form of court testimony from a
Introduction
First, the plaintiff's sample of invalid votes was unscientific and comprised neither a census, nor a representative sample of all invalid votes. Second, even if the sample were scientific, the counts for each candidate and for the number of invalid votes were aggregated to the precinct level, and therefore, any attempt to estimate the number of invalid votes for a particular candidate would be an example of ecological inference. Furthermore, due to the small percentage of invalid votes in each precinct, it is possible that all of the invalid votes were cast for Rossi or that all of the invalid votes were cast for Gregoire (Adolph, 2005) . The result in this case therefore hinged on a debate over the proper way to model the votes of invalid voters (Gill, 2005; Katz, 2005; Handcock, 2005) . However, in addressing the issues raised in Borders v King County, 2005 , the court defined procedures by which sufficient evidence might be obtained to overturn a close election result without modeling assumptions. In particular, the court ruled that persons who had cast invalid votes could testify and that their testimony could be used to adjust vote counts. During the trial, the defendants produced four invalid voters who testified that they had voted for Rossi and the court ruled that Rossi's vote total should be reduced by four. This ruling raises a number of pressing questions. First, what would have happened if the court had heard testimony from 130 more invalid Gregoire voters than invalid Rossi voters? 3 Second, does the state really want to allow samples of this type? There is no evidence that the sample of invalid voters in this case was representative, and one can imagine future scenarios in which the defendants and plaintiffs race to find invalid voters who are willing to testify that they voted for the opposing candidate. Alternatively, one could consider obtaining a complete list of all invalid voters, calling them each to testify on their ballots and adjusting the vote totals accordingly. However, as in many sampling problems, obtaining a census may prove impossible due to time and money constraints.
In Borders v King County, 2005, the plaintiffs and the defendants found a total of 1, 439 invalid voters, and this combined sample was not a census of all invalid voters in the state, just a lower bound that was "cherry picked" from the precincts with high Gregoire margins (found by the plaintiffs) and high Rossi margins (found by the defendants). In principle, the parties could have attempted to find all the invalid voters. However, this is of course only feasible for the classes of invalid voters that we know: felons, the deceased, non-citizens, etc. Furthermore, even if the plaintiffs and defendants had collected a census at the first stage, the second stage (calling over one thousand witnesses) would be extremely costly and time consuming. Even if the state (or possibly the parties) were willing to foot the bill, a governor is elected for a four year term, and it is not possible to know ahead of time how long it would take to call all the witnesses (especially when the defendants in the case have an incentive to delay). Finally, even if the parties could find all the invalid voters (as we will assume throughout the rest of this paper) and call them all as witnesses, the court still faces problems. Some invalid voters might be deceased, or forget whom they supported, or refuse to testify (nonresponse) and some invalid voters might lie or misremember (measurement error). The likely magnitude of measurement error is difficult to assess.
An invalid voter may misremember and also has an incentive to lie, because telling the truth would hurt their preferred candidate. However, an invalid voter who testifies is sure to be cross examined harshly by the side that is losing a vote, and the risk of a perjury charge is a large cost in comparison to the relatively small chance that your lie will get your preferred candidate elected. In light of this, we will consider situations where the measurement error can be assumed to be negligible. Nonresponse is likely to be a larger problem, even in the courtroom setting. The assumed sampling frame is the list of invalid voters, and some of the classes of invalid voters (e.g. the deceased) will be unable to testify. Additionally, those invalid voters that are able to testify (e.g. released felons) may be unavailable, forget their vote choices, or refuse to testify. (In Belcher v Mayor of Ann Arbor, 1978, some invalid voters refused to testify and were held in contempt of court, but the Michigan Supreme Court eventually upheld their right to refuse to testify.) Nonresponse in samples has been studied extensively. However, most of the techniques that have been developed for nonresponse involve creating a model for the nonresponders based on the responders.
In this paper, we explore the limits of design-based inference without modeling assumptions, and hence avoid the debates over modeling the prob-ability of election reversal (Finkelstein and Robbins, 1973; Downs et al., 1978; Gilliland and Meier, 1986; Robbins, 1986; Harris, 1988 ) and the traditional weighting or imputation based approaches to nonresponse (Groves et al., 2002; Little and Rubin, 1986 ). Instead we utilize the discrete and finite nature of the problem to form bounds without assuming any similarity between the responders and the nonresponders. The outline of the paper is as follows.
In Section 2 we describe the court's decision problem for both simple random samples and stratified random samples. Taking into account observed characteristics of voters, we apply an exact likelihood ratio testing procedure to address the decision problem, providing power analyses for both types of samples, with and without nonresponse. Section 3 discusses the implications of these results for legal challenges to election results. (Chernoff and Moses, 1986) , it has a lower risk of incorrectly voiding an election result than does a minimax rule. Hence the Neyman-Pearson rule implicitly protects against the costly legal remedy of conducting a new election, this being the only realistic remedy (Harvard Law Review , 1975) . One could argue that such protection should be built into the decision procedure explicitly through an asymmetric loss function, but it would be difficult for the court to decide on a particular loss function, and the Neyman-Pearson rule can be easily related to p-values which more closely reflect the evidentiary nature of court proceedings.
In Borders v King County, 2005, the plaintiffs and defendants together identified 1,439 invalid voters. If we make the working (albeit incorrect) assumptions that this number represents a census of all the invalid voters and that there were two candidates (that we call Gregoire and Rossi without loss of generality), then we can get some insight into the decision problem.
(We also assume each voter cast exactly one ballot, it was for one of these candidates, and we exclude spoiled ballots.) Since the margin of victory among all ballots (valid and invalid) for Gregoire was 129 voters, the null hypothesis of a tie or Gregoire victory among valid ballots corresponds to 784 (or greater) of the invalid voters for Gregoire and 655 (or fewer) of the invalid voters for Rossi (this of course involves the simplification to two candidates).
Note that 784 is greater than half of the 1,439 invalid voters, hence, if the invalid voters voted for Gregoire and Rossi in the same proportions as valid voters, then the null hypothesis is true (i.e. Gregoire was the rightful winner).
Furthermore, this demonstrates that the one sided alternative in the direction of a Rossi win indicates that Gregoire had a proportion of the support among the invalid voters larger than 54%. The court would therefore rule to void the election result only when there was sufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis of Gregoire support less than or equal to 54%. (Note that this test of the composite null hypothesis is equivalent to the test of the simple null hypothesis of a tie because if we can reject the hypothesis of a tie in the direction of a Rossi victory, we can also reject any hypothesis of a Gregoire victory.) 8
The Decision Problem for Simple Random Sampling from a Sampling Frame of Invalid Voters
With a simple random sample, it is relatively straightforward to form decision rules and conduct exact power calculations based on the hypergeometric distribution. If we denote the total number of invalid voters as N and we denote the total number of invalid Gregoire voters as G, we can write the null and alternative hypotheses as the following:
Given a simple random sample of size n from this finite population, we define g to be the sampled number of Gregoire invalid voters and q α to be the 1 − α quantile from a hypergeometric distribution with N = 1439 and G = 784. The decision rule that rejects the null for g > q α is a likelihood ratio test and is uniformly most powerful against all alternatives (see Lehmann and Romano (2005) ). We see from the plot that the most powerful α ≤ .05 level test based on a simple random sample of 130 invalid voters would have very little power against mild to moderate alternatives. In fact, the power doesn't break 50% until G = 890 or when the true Gregoire proportion of invalids reaches 62%.
Hence, unless we believe that invalid voters heavily favor Gregoire, an exact level α = 5% likelihood ratio test based on a random sample of this size would be unlikely to generate enough evidence of a Rossi victory. Additionally, Figure 1 shows that to achieve high levels of power for reasonable proportions of Gregoire invalid voters, we need extremely large sample sizes. Even with a sample size of 1000, we only break 50% on power when the Gregoire proportion of invalid voters breaks 56%. Therefore, anyone contemplating the implementation of this sampling scheme and decision rule, should acknowledge the possible necessity of sampling nearly all invalid voters.
The power gets worse if we allow for nonresponse. In this scenario, the current null hypothesis does not provide enough restrictions to allow the exact derivation of the probability of Type I error because under everything but the most extreme hypotheses for G the non-responders could have all been Gregoire voters or all Rossi voters. To state this explicitly, let n nr be the number of nonresponders, and let g r be the number of observed Gregoire invalid voters among the responders. Then both of these variables are observable, while the original g (the total number of Gregoire invalid voters in the sample) is now unobservable. We know that g r ≤ g ≤ g r + n nr , but without further assumptions or a combination of additional data and assumptions,
we have no means of estimating a distribution over this range. Therefore, in the absence of such assumptions, the only way to ensure an α ≤ .05 level test is to treat all invalid non-responders as if they were invalid Rossi responders when calculating the rejection region, and to reject only when the number of observed Gregoire responders (g r ) exceeds the critical value. Since max(g − n nr , 0) ≤ g r ≤ min(g, n − n nr ), we can determine upper and lower bounds for the probability that g r will exceed the threshold set by q α . In our example with a target α of 5%, this effectively means that for large sample sizes and any substantial proportion of nonresponse, the true probability of Type I error could be anywhere between .05 and zero. The actual α bounds are plotted for an example with 1% nonresponse in Figure 2 .
The power of this test is also bounded by using the distributions of max(g − n nr , 0) and min(g, n − n nr ). In Figure 3 , we present exact power bounds for sample sizes of 130 (− − −) , 1000 (· · ·) and the whole population (-) against different alternative values and for different levels of nonresponse. These plots make explicit the following two important points.
First, an α level test in the presence of nonresponse is necessarily quite conservative and may have very low power because we must assume that the nonresponders voted for Rossi if we want to maintain the α level of the test. Figure 2: Exact bounds for the actual probability of Type I error in the presence of 1% nonresponse and various sample sizes. The decision rule (reject only if the responding Gregoire invalids exceed the critical value) was chosen to ensure that the probability of Type I error did not exceed 5%.
Second, even if we sample all the invalid voters, the presence of nonresponse will create the possibility that we will not be able to reject the null for mild to moderate values of the alternative.
The Decision Problem for Stratified Random Sampling from a Sampling Frame of Invalid Voters
Stratified random sampling often increases the power of a test, and for this application, we might hope that stratification would increase power for two reasons:
First, the plaintiffs and defendants presented ballot counts for both valid and invalid voters at the precinct level, and therefore, if there were extreme Exact bounds for power in the presence of 1%, 5%, 10%, and 20% nonresponse and with n=130 (− − −), n=1000 (· · ·), and n=1439, or the whole population (-). The decision rule (reject only if the responding Gregoire invalids exceed the critical value) was chosen to ensure that the probability of Type I error did not exceed 5%.
polarization at the precinct level, there would be constraints on the number of possible invalid Gregoire voters. For example, in a given precinct, if there were more invalid voters than the total number of valid and invalid Rossi voters then the remaining invalid voters are Gregoire voters. However, due to the lack of precinct level polarization in U.S. elections, these extra constraints do not come into play because the number of invalid ballots will always be much smaller than the total number of Gregoire ballots or Rossi ballots.
A second reason to think that stratification may increase the power of the test is that it may reduce the variance of the sampled number of Gregoire invalid voters within each stratum. Because we are forming a decision rule based on counts of invalid voters, and the majority of these invalid voters are felons (who are disproportionately male), an obvious stratification is on sex. This is possible (for the most part) because we have sex information on most of the invalid voters. Among the 1,439 invalid voters in Borders v King County, 2005, there were 1,082 invalid male voters, 356 invalid female voters, and one invalid voter of unknown sex. To simplify the presentation, we will assume that the invalid voter of unknown sex was female.
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As shown in Figure 5 (a) the possible benefits from stratification depend on the heterogeneity between the strata, but they may also depend on the level of nonresponse. In the previous section, we presented α level power bounds for the LR test based on a simple random sample with nonresponse.
We can calculate similar power bounds for our test based on a stratified random sample by using inequalities analogous to those of the last section.
The rejection region in Figure 4 where (q 1m , q 1f ), . . . , (q km , q kf ) represent points just outside the boundary of the rejection region. In the presence of nonresponse among the male and female invalid voters, we know only that g mr ≤ g m ≤ g mr + n mnr and g fr ≤ g f ≤ g fr + n fnr , where g mr and g fr are the male and female Gregoire responders and n mnr and n fnr are the number of male and female nonresponders. Since g m and g f can be anywhere within these bounds, we must use a decision rule which replaces g m and g f with g mr and g fr in order to maintain the α level of the test. From the above bounds we know that max(g m − n mnr , 0) ≤ g mr ≤ min(g m , n m − n mnr ) and max(g f − n fnr , 0) ≤ g fr ≤ min(g f , n f − n fnr ), and therefore we can obtain bounds for the probability of rejection by considering the joint distribution of the male and female lower and upper bounds.
The joint distributions for the lower and upper bounds allow us to compare the probability bounds for a simple random sample and a stratified random sample under various levels of nonresponse. In Figure 5 we present power bounds for the simple random sample and a sample proportionally stratified on sex with overall sample sizes of 130 and a null of G = G m +G f ≤ 784. The solid curves represent the power bounds from a simple random sample with differing levels of nonresponse (these bounds collapse to a single curve when there is no nonresponse). The dashed curves represent the power bounds from a proportionally stratified random sample with differing levels of nonresponse (the nonresponse is assumed to be proportional between males and females). Figure 5 shows that under a decision rule that bounds α at 5%, substantial nonresponse can seriously reduce the power of the stratified test to the point that there is no guarantee that the stratified test will produce any benefit. For example, with 10% nonresponse, and when G/N = .63
and G m /N m >> G f /N f , the power benefit from stratification over SRS can be as great as 0.24 but it can also be as small as 0.01. Hence in the case were stratification promises to provide the greatest benefit, substantial nonresponse may effectively eliminate these gains. 
Nonresponse is assumed to be independent of sex, but the numbers of Gregoire and Rossi nonresponders are allowed to vary within their deterministic bounds. The solid curves represent the power bounds from a simple random sample. These bounds collapse to a single curve under 0% non-response. The dashed curves represent the power bounds from a proportionally stratified random sample.
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Conclusion
As this paper has shown, classical testing within the sampling design-based framework and a Type I error rate of 5% will not have high power unless the sample size is a large proportion of the population or the true parameter value is quite extreme. One can attempt to increase the power through stratification, but the gains are not assured, and will depend on the heterogeneity between the groups. Furthermore, substantial nonresponse may decrease the power of either procedure and may eliminate the gains from a stratified test.
In simple terms, in order to maintain the level of the test at α in the presence of nonresponse, we must treat the nonresponders as if they would have given evidence for the null hypothesis, and therefore we may not be able to reject the null for moderate values of the alternative hypothesis, even if we sample the entire population.
There are three major criticisms that can be leveled against the analysis in this paper. First, the testing framework that bounds the maximum probability of Type I error at α is conservative, and the choice of α ≤ .05 is arbitrary. We are not endorsing this testing procedure or a Type I error of 5%, however, we wanted to make explicit the ramifications for a popular statistical decision procedure when either nonresponse is a concern, or when an unrepresentative sample is used. The second major criticism can be leveled at our treatment of nonresponse. Treating all nonresponders as if they would have provided evidence for the null hypothesis is certainly conservative, but it is the only way to maintain the Type I error level of the test at α without making modeling assumptions. In a particular application, there may be reasonable modeling assumptions to be made, but this paper presents the limits of design-based inference for the standard asymmetric testing procedure. Third, in our attempt to produce a model-free statistical analysis, we have still made a number of assumptions. In particular, we have assumed only two candidates, we have ignored the possibility of measurement error or spoiled ballots, and perhaps most importantly the possibility of frame error The implications of this work for legal challenges to election results are clear. Given the fact that post-vote vote-choice data will often be plagued by nonresponse (and other issues assumed away in this paper), there is little chance of obtaining a representative sample, and court decisions on the basis of such data will likely depend on strong modeling assumptions (whether or not these are acknowledged). More broadly speaking, while courts may be reluctant to make explicit findings about out-of-sample data (e.g. invalid voters who did not testify), courts should note that when they conduct procedures (e.g. the adjustment of vote totals) on the basis of a potentially unrepresentative sample (e.g. invalid voters that testify), they may be implicitly making findings about this out-of-sample data.
